The University of Akron

IdeaExchange@UAkron
Akron Law Review

Akron Law Journals

May 2019

Brandeis's IP Federalism: Thoughts on Erie at
Eighty
Joseph Scott Miller

Please take a moment to share how this work helps you through this survey. Your feedback will be
important as we plan further development of our repository.
Follow this and additional works at: https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons
Recommended Citation
Miller, Joseph Scott (2019) "Brandeis's IP Federalism: Thoughts on Erie at Eighty," Akron Law Review: Vol. 52 : Iss.
2 , Article 7.
Available at: https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol52/iss2/7

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Akron Law Journals at IdeaExchange@UAkron, the
institutional repository of The University of Akron in Akron, Ohio, USA. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Akron Law Review by an authorized administrator of IdeaExchange@UAkron. For more information, please
contact mjon@uakron.edu, uapress@uakron.edu.

Miller: IP Federalism

BRANDEIS’S IP FEDERALISM:
THOUGHTS ON ERIE AT EIGHTY
Joseph Scott Miller*

I.
II.
III.

Introduction ............................................................... 367
Erie’s IP Context ....................................................... 371
A. The 1830s and ‘40s ............................................. 374
B. The 1920s and ‘30s ............................................. 380
Conclusion ................................................................. 389

“I have always regarded the [Erie] decision as one of the modern
cornerstones of our federalism, expressing policies that profoundly touch
the allocation of judicial power between the state and federal systems.”
— Harlan the Younger 1
I. INTRODUCTION
Like each of us, Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins 2 contains
multitudes. 3 Most pragmatically, “[u]nder the Erie doctrine, federal courts
sitting in diversity apply state substantive law and federal procedural

* Professor, University of Georgia School of Law. © 2019 Joseph Scott Miller. With great thanks to
those who organized and attended the Akron Law Review’s September 2018 “Erie at Eighty” event.
1. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 474 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring). See also Guar. Tr. Co.
of N.Y. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109–10 (1945):
Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins . . . expressed a policy that touches vitally the proper distribution
of judicial power between State and federal courts . . . [and] has been applied with an eye
alert to essentials in avoiding disregard of State law in diversity cases in the federal courts.
A policy so important to our federalism must be kept free from entanglements with
analytical or terminological niceties.
2. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
3. See Walt Whitman, Song of Myself, in LEAVES OF GRASS 29, (David McKay ed., 1891)
(“Do I contradict myself? | Very well then I contradict myself, | (I am large, I contain multitudes.)”).

SYMPOSIUM, ERIE AT EIGHTY: CHOICE OF LAW ACROSS THE DISCIPLINES
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law.” 4 Parsing the substantive from the procedural “is sometimes a
challenging endeavor,” 5 to be sure, but the goal—identifying the rule of
decision in state law—is clear. The Erie case holds, as a formal matter,
that the state-law referent comprises not only a state’s statutory law, but
also its decisional law (be the question local or general): So far as the
Rules of Decision Act 6 is concerned, “whether the law of the State shall
be declared by its Legislature in a statute or by its highest court in a
decision is not a matter of federal concern.” 7 The Erie provocation,
finally, “is about effectuating a policy of federalism”—about “allocat[ing
power] between federal courts and state courts, and federal law and state
law.” 8 It is that provocation that prompts me to explore, in the Erie
context, our intellectual-property-law federalism.
The choice to propertize information, in the Anglo-American
utilitarian tradition, is easy to explain: give a time-limited right to exclude
others from competitive imitation to cut off at the pass an
underproduction-of-ideas risk. 9 Atop this foundation is a body of law that
makes an especially fruitful ground for considering juridical federalism.
First, the five modes of IP protection sit on a continuum from largely

4. Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 (1996). Also, where a federal
court has supplemental jurisdiction over a state claim, see 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2012), state law supplies
the rule of decision. See, e.g., Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 151 (1988). Courts should, however,
approach state law mindful of the presence of that primary federal claim. See Alexander Reinert, Erie
Step Zero, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2341, 2367–76 (2017).
5. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 427. An inquiry of this sort thoroughly fractured the Court, most
recently, in Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393 (2010).
6. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92 (1789) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1652 (2012)).
7. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78. For a detailed analysis of the Erie case on its own stated grounds, by
one of the decision’s most able defenders, see Ernest A. Young, A General Defense of Erie Railroad
Co. v. Tompkins, 10 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 17 (2013). For a bracing analysis from one of Erie’s most
trenchant critics, see Suzanna Sherry, Wrong, Out of Step, and Pernicious: Erie As the Worst Decision
of All Time, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 129 (2011). For an excellent contemporary middle path, see Caleb
Nelson, A Critical Guide to Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 921 (2013). All
three pieces have helped me enormously in thinking about Erie more clearly.
8. Donald Earl Childress III, Redeeming Erie: A Response to Suzanna Sherry, 39 PEPP. L.
REV. 155, 161 (2011); see also Young, supra note 7, at 20 (concluding that Erie embodies “the vision
of limited federal lawmaking . . . in which the federal separation of powers reinforces federalism by
limiting when federal lawmaking may displace state law.”).
9. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The propertization strategy for intangibles is discussed in
hundreds of articles. To choose but one, see Amy Kapczynski, The Cost of Price: Why and How to
Get Beyond Intellectual Property Internalism, 59 UCLA L. REV. 970, 974–75 (2012) (describing the
strategy’s internal logic). For a general description of tangibles and intangibles, see Thomas W.
Merrill, The Property Strategy, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 2061, 2062–63 (2012) (describing “property [a]s
a distinctive strategy for determining how resources will be used and by whom,” in which “[s]pecific
resources are assigned to designated persons who have unique prerogatives in dealing with the
resource relative to all other persons in the relevant normative community.”).
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national forms to largely state-law forms: Patent law is squarely at the
national end, followed by copyright, then trademark, then trade secret, and
finally the state-law right of publicity. Second, the judicial role in all five
areas is, and has long been, significant: The statutes for these regimes are
framed in terms as broad as they are spare, and the relevant agencies either
lack the power to make substantive rules elaborating on the broad
statutory text or simply don’t exist. 10 There is thus ample judicial activity
to consider—both within and across the federal and state regimes. 11
Given the vertical and horizontal extensions of our legal institutions,
fully exploring federalism for IP law would require analyzing both the
differing roles of courts at the state and federal level and the differing
roles of legislatures regarding courts at both levels. I do not attempt that
complete mapping process in this essay. Even a casual observer of the last
few decades of intellectual property law can readily see, however, that our
IP federalism is not so much a set of separate spheres as it is a heartily
swirled marble cake; a blending ensemble of principles and practices.12 If
we take Erie to envision crisply separated state and federal substantive
law, IP law has not fulfilled that vision. If, however, we take Erie to
envision genuinely polyarchic experimentation, with insights from local
and national experiences redounding to benefit both state and federal
law, 13 IP law exemplifies that vision’s possibilities.
As befits this commemoration of Erie at 80, I focus my attention on
the part(s) that the judiciary plays in the matrix of legal institutions. My
outlook on judicial role flows from my sense of what is special, in law,
about case-by-case doctrinal development. 14 Decisional law—a public,
10. Regarding the Patent & Trademark Office’s inability to make substantive rules about core
patent and core trademark statutory provisions, see Joseph Scott Miller, Substance, Procedure, and
the Divided Patent Power, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 31, 32–33 & n.8–9 (2011). On the Copyright Office’s
inability, see Andy Gass, Considering Copyright Rulemaking: The Constitutional Question, 27
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1047, 1052 (2012). There are, so far as I am aware, no state or federal agencies
charged with a leading role in developing trade secret law or the right of publicity.
11. It is “an unappreciated reality of U.S. intellectual property law,” at least among those who
spend little time with it, that “despite th[e] codification[s], courts continue to play an extremely
important role in developing the law gradually.” Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Introduction: Exploring
an Unlikely Connection, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW 1, 3 (Shyamkrishna
Balganesh ed., 2013). Every paper gathered in this volume rewards a close read; it is a wonderful
collection.
12. It is, in other words, a “polyphonic” interactive federalism of the sort Professor Robert
Schapiro describes. See Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA L.
REV. 243, 252–54, 285–301 (2005); Robert A. Schapiro, Interjurisdictional Enforcement of Rights in
a Post-Erie World, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1399, 1402–06 (2005).
13. See Young, supra note 7, at 67–76, 113–21 (expressing a view congenial to my suggestion).
14. All the blunders and manglings are down to me, of course, but my take here draws
inspiration from, among countless items, LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (rev. ed. 1969)
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written form of specialized justification for deploying public power—
weaves together sources of customary and positive law. As courts
adjudicate cases, they elaborate on their precedents’ principles and
construe and apply positive law from within this practice of reasoned
justification. The resulting public explanations inform legislatures and
citizens how law—as a conceptual system for self-governance, as well as
a matrix within which to engage in private ordering—does (or does not)
cohere. Similarly, as federal and state courts apply rules of decision within
and across the federal-state marker, their public explanations inform
judges and litigants how to justify different outcomes within that same
conceptual system (our federalism included).
A core function of courts, then, is to play a public dialogic role in the
legal system15 by means of their ongoing discursive practice within that
system. It matters less, frankly, whether judges are finding law (as
tribunes or oracles) or making law (as sources independent from
legislatures). 16 The key is that courts are, and forever will be, discussing
law 17—justifying law’s dictates through reasoned elaboration in the

and multiple papers by Professor Gerald Postema. See, e.g., Gerald J. Postema, Philosophy of the
Common Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 588 (Jules
Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 2002).
15. See Martin H. Redish, Reassessing the Allocation of Judicial Business Between State and
Federal Courts: Federal Jurisdiction and “The Martian Chronicles”, 78 VA. L. REV. 1769, 1772–73
(1992) (describing the benefits of “intersystemic cross-pollination” from federal and state judges
deciding federal and state questions); Martin H. Redish, Supreme Court Review of State Court
“Federal” Decisions: A Study in Interactive Federalism, 19 GA. L. REV. 861, 898 (1985) (describing
some benefits of “inter-federal judicial dialogue”).
16. For one lively depiction of the contrast, see Justice Holmes’ dissent in Black & White
Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 532–36 (1928).
Justices Brandeis and Stone, who help make the majority in Erie, both joined that Holmes dissent. Id.
at 536. More generally, see Stephen E. Sachs, Finding Law, 107 CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019).
17. See A.W.B. Simpson, The Common Law and Legal Theory, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN
JURISPRUDENCE (SECOND SERIES) 77, 90 (A.W.B. Simpson ed., 1973):
Nor does the common law system admit the possibility of a court, however elevated,
reaching a final, authoritative statement of what the law is in a general abstract sense. It is
as if the system placed particular value upon dissension, obscurity, and the tentative
character of the judicial utterances. As a system of legal thought the common law then is
inherently vague; it is a feature of the system that uniquely authentic statements of the
rules . . . cannot be made;
James Boyd White, What’s an Opinion For?, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1363, 1367–68 (1995):
The judicial opinion is a claim of meaning: it describes the case, telling its story in a
particular way; it explains or justifies the result; and in the process it connects the case
with earlier cases, the particular facts with more general concerns. It translates the
experience of the parties, and the languages in which they naturally speak of it, into the
language of the law, which connects cases across time and space . . . . The opinion thus
engages in the central conversation that is for us the law, a conversation that the opinion
itself makes possible.
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judges’ official public decisions—with what one hopes are sufficient
clarity and candor to make their decisions fit for purpose. It seems
reasonable to suppose, moreover, that the more varied are the courts in
which these discourses of justification take place, with differing stakes for
the differing interwoven legal regimes, 18 the greater will be the long-run
benefit to the polity that these varied courts serve. 19
Stepping into the past, I consider three major IP cases in Part II that
provide a context for better understanding Erie. In part A, I explore a case
from the mid-1800s that frames Swift, the case Erie overthrew. In part B
I examine two cases that, like Erie, produced opinions from Justice
Brandeis. One of these is a lone dissent from early in his Supreme Court
tenure, and the other is a majority opinion from his last full year on the
Court. 20 One prefigures Erie’s focus on the different roles that judges and
legislatures should play in legal innovation, and the other reorients the
post-Erie world to its next natural focus—the degree to which federal
positive law has, in a given case, preempted state law. These two
additional Brandeis opinions bracket Erie and help us understand it more
deeply by providing a much richer context in which to read it.
II. ERIE’S IP CONTEXT
Erie states it plain: “There is no federal general common law.” 21 The
principle, Erie asserts, is constitutive: “Congress has no power to declare
substantive rules of common law” as such, 22 “[a]nd no clause in the

18. In stare decisis terms, there are higher stakes in a state court making precedent on state law
than in a state court deciding a question of federal law, and higher stakes in a federal court making
precedent on federal law than in a federal court deciding a question of state law. Of course, for the
litigants involved in a case (e.g., a criminal defendant making a Fourth Amendment objection to state
reliance on the fruits of a wrongful search), the decisional stakes may be quite high indeed.
19. Cf. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (surmising
“that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas—that the best test of truth is
the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market . . . .”). Justice Brandeis
joined Justice Holmes in this dissent. Id. at 631.
20. Justice Brandeis joined the Court in June 1916 and retired in February 1939. THE OXFORD
COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 1132 (Kermit L. Hall et. al. eds., 2d
ed. 2005).
21. 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
22. Id. In other words, “Congress may not confer a general common lawmaking power on the
federal courts . . . [and] can declare only statute law, made through the Article I lawmaking process.”
Young, supra note 7, at 69 (emphasis added). But see Craig Green, Repressing Erie’s Myth, 96 CAL.
L. REV. 595, 611–14 (2008) (critiquing this contention, in Erie, about congressional power’s full
formal reach).
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Constitution purports to confer such a power upon the federal courts.” 23
Of course, in the instances where Congress has established a federal
standard and given the federal courts a role in its application, the courts
have hewn to that statutory standard. Those federal standards, moreover,
can approach common-law-like generality, 24 or even expressly invoke the
common law itself. 25 “[A]bsent some congressional authorization to
formulate substantive rules of decision,” however, “federal common law
exists only in such narrow areas as those concerned with the rights and
obligations of the United States, interstate and international disputes
implicating the conflicting rights of States or our relations with foreign
nations, and admiralty cases.” 26
In rejecting the view that the diversity jurisdiction empowered the
federal courts to freely formulate a general common law for their own use,
Erie overruled the bête noire of those who sought greater room for statelaw experimentation in social policy27—the Court’s decision nearly a

23. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78. See also City of Milwaukee v. Illinois & Michigan, 451 U.S. 304, 312
(1981) (“Federal courts, unlike state courts, are not general common-law courts and do not possess a
general power to develop and apply their own rules of decision.”).
24. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (“Every contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, is declared to be illegal.”). See also Leegin Creative Leather Prod., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551
U.S. 877, 899 (2007) (“From the beginning the Court has treated the Sherman Act as a common-law
statute.”) (emphasis added). For an incisive analysis of the very idea of a “common law statute,” see
Margaret H. Lemos, Interpretive Methodology and Delegations to Courts: Are “Common Law
Statutes” Different?, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW 89 (Shyamkrishna
Balganesh ed., 2013).
25. See FED. R. EVID. 501 (“The common law—as interpreted by United States courts in the
light of reason and experience—governs a claim of privilege . . . . But in a civil case, state law governs
privilege regarding a claim or defense for which state law supplies the rule of decision.”). Congress
enacted the Federal Rules of Evidence as a free-standing statute in 1975. Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L.
93-595, 88 Stat. 1926.
26. Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981) (footnotes omitted).
See generally Atherton v. F.D.I.C., 519 U.S. 213 (1997) (collecting and synthesizing cases in this
line); Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 726 (2004) (summarizing this framework). For a lively
tour of these areas, see Caleb Nelson, The Persistence of General Law, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 503,
507–18 (2006).
27. Justice Brandeis, Erie’s architect, was plainly such a person. See, e.g., New State Ice Co.
v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting from the Court’s invalidation of a
state business-licensing law):
Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious consequences to the nation.
It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may,
if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments
without risk to the rest of the country.
See also THE BRANDEIS GUIDE TO THE MODERN WORLD 4 (Alfred Lief ed., 1941) (“The field for
special effort should now be the state, the city, the village—and each should be led to seek to excel
in something peculiar to it.”).
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century earlier in Swift v. Tyson. 28 Swift and its federal-general-commonlaw progeny had, in the Fuller Court’s hands, come to foster predatory
forum shopping by large, monied corporations who sought ever more
wealth-protective doctrines in a more sympathetic precinct—i.e., the
federal courthouse. 29 Erie was a sharp turn, recentering diversity cases on
state law substance, both statutory and decisional, to deter unfair forum
shopping within a single forum state. 30 “By eliminating federal general
common law, Erie reduced the substantive significance of diversity
jurisdiction, thereby deflating federal courts’ reputation as antiprogressive
lawmakers.” 31 In that process, the Court pushed state common law
conceptually closer to state statutory law. 32 Questions about how to best
to conceptualize the common law’s character, in state or federal court,
loom behind Swift and Erie. Indeed, in the early days of the Republic, the
common law’s federal-court status—especially as to criminal law—was a
matter of heated dispute. 33 Swift shaped the common law’s character in

28. 41 U.S. 1 (1842). It is right there in Erie’s opening line: “The question for decision is
whether the oft-challenged doctrine of Swift v. Tyson shall now be disapproved.” Erie R. Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 69 (1938) (footnote omitted).
29. See EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION: ERIE,
THE JUDICIAL POWER, AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY
AMERICA 39–63 (2000). Purcell describes Justice Brandeis’s views:
Brandeis had long considered [Swift’s] doctrine legally unsound and socially divisive. He
believed that it intruded on the law-making authority of the states, encouraged
manipulative litigation tactics, and unfairly enhanced the litigation position of national
corporations. . . . In 1930, writing for the Court, he openly expressed his doubts about
Swift’s fundamental legitimacy. It was, he declared, “for the state courts to interpret and
declare the law of the State.”
Id. at 101 (quoting Brinkerhoff-Faris Tr. & Sav. Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673, 681 n.8 (1930)). See also
JEFFREY ROSEN, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS: AMERICAN PROPHET 120 (2016) (“The fact that Brandeis was
requiring federal judges to defer to more populist state court judges, whose decisions (at least in his
time) were less likely to be sympathetic to big corporations, must have been, for Brandeis, icing on
the cake.”).
30. Erie, 304 U.S. at 74–77.
31. Craig Green, Can Erie Survive as Federal Common Law?, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 813,
826 (2013).
32. See Erie, 304 U.S. at 79 & n.23 (embracing Justice Holmes’ critiques of Swift, found in his
dissents in the Kuhn and Black & White Taxicab cases). See also Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal, 215 U.S.
349, 372 (1910) (Holmes, J., dissenting):
[T]he law of the States . . . has been recognized by this court as issuing from the state
courts as well as from the state legislatures. . . . The law of a State does not become
something outside of the state court and independent of it by being called the common
law. Whatever it is called, it is the law as declared by the state judges and nothing else.
33. See Anthony J. Bellia, Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, General Law in Federal Court, 54 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 655, 664–72, 676–87 (2013); William A. Fletcher, The General Common Law and
Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789: The Example of Marine Insurance, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1513,
1517–38 (1984); Stewart Jay, Origins of Federal Common Law: Part One, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 1003
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diversity cases. But it was not the Court’s first civil case to opine on the
common law’s prospects as federal general law in federal courts. That was
a federal copyright case.
A.

The 1830s and ‘40s

It is banal to say, today, that “[f]ederal crimes are defined by
Congress, not the courts.” 34 In 1790, however, it was far from clear
whether federal courts could, as part of their inherent power, enforce a
national common law of crimes. The Supreme Court ruled out that
prospect in 1812. Specifically, in United States v. Hudson 35—an
attempted prosecution for common-law seditious libel 36—the Court
rejected the contention that federal courts “can exercise a common law
jurisdiction in criminal cases.”37 A court has the inherent power to insist
on party decorum and adherence to its orders, i.e., to “fine for contempt”
and “imprison for contumacy.” 38 A freestanding federal criminal
prohibition, by contrast, would have to come from Congress: “The
legislative authority of the Union must first make an act a crime, affix a
punishment to it, and declare the Court that shall have jurisdiction of the
offence.” 39 At least with respect to criminal law, the Union’s legislative
authority could reach what its judicial authority could not, unaided, grasp.
What, then, of civil matters? Eight years before Swift, the Court
decided a copyright infringement case that raised the civil-claim

(1985) [hereinafter Jay, Origins: Part One]; Stewart Jay, Origins of Federal Common Law: Part Two,
133 U. PA. L. REV. 1231 (1985) [hereinafter Jay, Origins: Part Two].
34. United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 267 n.6 (1997).
35. 11 U.S. 32 (1812).
36. See Jay, Origins: Part One, supra note 33, at 1013–15.
37. See United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. at 34.
38. Id.
39. Id. (emphasis added). See also 1 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 314–
15 (1826) (describing Hudson’s holding that, for the federal courts, “to exercise criminal jurisdiction
in common-law cases was not within their implied powers, and it was necessary for congress to make
the act a crime, to affix a punishment to it, and to declare the court which should have jurisdiction”).
Hudson thus reflected the anti-Federalist Republicans’ “underlying concern, which was to deny that
federal courts had been given a general common-law jurisdiction by the Constitution.” Jay, Origins:
Part Two, supra note 33, at 1241. And the basic action-sequence there prescribed—Congress first,
federal courts second—has since been generalized. See Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc.,
451 U.S. 630, 640–41 (1981):
The vesting of jurisdiction in the federal courts does not in and of itself give rise to
authority to formulate federal common law, nor does the existence of congressional
authority under Art. I mean that federal courts are free to develop a common law to govern
those areas until Congress acts.
(internal citation omitted); Young, supra note 7, at 19 (“Erie articulated a view of federal law as
fundamentally interstitial in its nature . . . .”).
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counterpart to Hudson. In that case, Wheaton v. Peters, 40 the owners of
purported statutory copyrights in twelve volumes of Supreme Court case
reports, Wheaton’s Reports, had sued the successor case reporter for
duplicating the contents of Wheaton’s Reports in a less expensive
format. 41 Wheaton sued in equity, seeking to enjoin further duplication of
the offending books. 42 The court’s jurisdiction was original, not
predicated on diversity. 43 As a formal matter, this case, like Hudson before
it, raised no question about the formal scope of the Rules of Decision Act,
which was (at that time) directed to “trials at common law.” 44
Those of us who till the fields of IP law well know the Wheaton case
for its holding “that no reporter has or can have any copyright in the
written opinions delivered by this court; and that the judges thereof cannot
confer on any reporter any such right.” 45 This is a principle now codified,
and expanded to all U.S.-government works, in the Copyright Act. 46 But

40. 33 U.S. 591 (1834).
41. See Craig Joyce, “A Curious Chapter in the History of Judicature”: Wheaton v. Peters and
the Rest of the Story (of Copyright in the New Republic), 42 HOUS. L. REV. 325, 362–85 (2005). The
proceedings in Wheaton were unusually colorful, and Professor Joyce tells the story masterfully.
42. Id. at 362–63 (describing Wheaton’s bill in equity).
43. See Act of Feb. 15, 1819, ch. 19, 3 Stat. 481 (providing that “the circuit courts of the United
States shall have original cognisance, as well in equity as at law, of all actions, suits, controversies,
and cases, arising under any law of the United States, granting or confirming to authors or inventors
the exclusive right to their respective writings, inventions, and discoveries”) (codified as amended at
28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2012)).
44. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92 (1789). Congress did not enlarge the RDA
to its current form, covering simply “civil actions,” until the 1948 codification of what is now Title
28 of the United States Code. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, Pub. L. No. 80–773, § 1652, 62 Stat.
869, 944. As for the pre-Erie era, as Professor Fletcher has explained:
[i]t was quite clear that section 34 itself did not require the federal courts to follow local
state law when sitting in equity. Chief Justice Marshall, in a widely quoted comment, had
remarked that he had always conceived “the technical term, ‘trials at common law,’” of
section 34 to apply “to suits at common law as contradistinguished from those which come
before the court sitting as a court of equity or admiralty.”
Fletcher, supra note 33, at 1529 (quoting United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187, 188 (C.C.D. Va. 1807)
(No. 14,694) (ruling on preliminary motions in Aaron Burr’s treason trial)).
45. Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 668 (1834).
46. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (defining a “work of the United States Government” as “a work
prepared by an officer or employee of the United States Government as part of that person’s official
duties”); 17 U.S.C. § 105 (2012) (providing that “[c]opyright protection under this title is not available
for any work of the United States Government, but the United States Government is not precluded
from receiving and holding copyrights transferred to it by assignment, bequest, or otherwise.”). In
Banks v. Manchester, the Court held that state judges similarly garnered no federal copyright in their
official written decisions:
The question is one of public policy, and there has always been a judicial consensus . . .
that no copyright could, under the statutes passed by congress, be secured in the products
of the labor done by judicial officers in the discharge of their judicial duties. The whole
work done by the judges constitutes the authentic exposition and interpretation of the law,
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the case is also notable for its Hudson-like holding of judicial impotence
to declare a freestanding federal general common law.
Wheaton’s reporters contained not only the texts of cases, but also
his originally authored supporting materials. 47 Given the arguable
copyrightability of the supporting materials, and the need for more factfinding, the Court passed on the parties’ other contentions before
remanding the case for trial. Wheaton contended both that the federal
copyright act protected his rights because he fulfilled the prescribed
formalities, and that, quite apart from the statute, common-law copyright
protected him from Peters’ piracy of the already-published volumes. 48
Peters contended both that Wheaton had not complied with all the
statutorily prescribed formalities, and that Wheaton had no common-law
rights in the published volumes, 49 rehearsing the trial court’s conclusions
in dismissing the complaint. 50
Peters prevailed on the law. The Court left open, for remand, the fact
question whether Wheaton had complied with the statutory formalities. 51
At the same time, though, the Court repudiated the claim to any commonlaw copyright, and in sweeping terms. First, although two prominent
English cases—Millar v. Taylor and Donaldson v. Becket 52—supported
the view that English common law (though not English statutory law)
would recognize a claim like Wheaton’s, 53 there was no national common
law in the U.S. that did so. As Justice McClean explained:
It is clear, there can be no common law of the United States. The federal
government is composed of twenty-four sovereign and independent
states; each of which may have its local usages, customs and common
which, binding every citizen, is free for publication to all, whether it is a declaration of
unwritten law, or an interpretation of a constitution or a statute.
128 U.S. 244, 253 (1888). And though there is no controlling Supreme Court case on the issue, the
better view in the Courts of Appeals extends the principle to state legislation. See Code Revision
Comm’n for Gen. Assembly of Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 906 F.3d 1229, 1238–55 (11th
Cir. 2018) (collecting cases and applying the principle to reject Georgia’s claim of federal copyright
in the Georgia state code’s official annotations).
47. Joyce, supra note 41, at 366.
48. Id. at 364–71.
49. Id. at 371–72.
50. Id. at 363–64.
51. Id. at 376.
52. The status of common-law copyright in England for published works circa 1770, and what
Donaldson v. Becket did or did not hold in respect of it, is a matter of lively dispute among copyright
scholars today—though far afield from my effort here. It suffices to observe that the only sound place
for the interested reader to begin, should she want to explore the matter further, is the unrivaled
treatment of the issues in H. Tomás Gómez-Arostegui, Copyright at Common Law in 1774, 47 CONN.
L. REV. 1 (2014).
53. Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 654–57 (1834).
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law. There is no principle which pervades the union and has the
authority of law, that is not embodied in the constitution or laws of the
union. The common law could be made a part of our federal system,
only by legislative adoption. When a common law right is asserted, we
must look to the state in which the controversy originated. 54

In other words, “the United States as a whole never possessed any
municipal common law of its own.” 55 The Wheaton rationale, though
prompted by a copyright question, is a sweeping rejection of national
common law. 56 Second, the Court concluded, there was also no commonlaw copyright in the published books as a matter of Pennsylvania state
law. 57
This two-step analysis has a familiar positivist feel, proceeding
sovereign by sovereign. In any event, as a result of the Court’s
conclusions, Wheaton’s copyrights in the published volumes would have
to be rooted in the federal copyright statute or they would not exist at all. 58
“Wheaton [thus] shows that Hudson’s restrictive view of the extent of
federal common-law powers was transferred very early to the civil
arena.” 59 Given how congenial Wheaton’s rationale would seem to be to
Erie’s plain statement that “[t]here is no federal general common law,”60
it is striking that Erie does not cite Wheaton. 61 Indeed, I can find no
54. Id. at 658 (emphasis added); See also Smith v. State of Alabama, 124 U.S. 465, 478 (1888)
(citing Wheaton):
There is no common law of the United States, in the sense of a national customary law,
distinct from the common law of England, as adopted by the several states each for itself,
applied as its local law, and subject to such alteration as may be provided by its own
statutes.
See also W. Union Tel. Co. v. Call Pub. Co., 181 U.S. 92, 101 (1901) (“There is no body of Federal
common law separate and distinct from the common law existing in the several States in the sense
that there is a body of statute law enacted by Congress separate and distinct from the body of statute
law enacted by the several States.”).
55. Bellia & Clark, supra note 33, at 705.
56. See id. (recognizing the general force of this passage in Wheaton); Fletcher, supra note 33,
at 1524–25 & n.48; Young, supra note 7, at 33–34, 43.
57. Wheaton, 33 U.S. at 658–61.
58. Id. at 662. Cf. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 312 (1981) (“Federal courts,
unlike state courts, are not general common-law courts and do not possess a general power to develop
and apply their own rules of decision.”).
59. Jay, Origins: Part Two, supra note 33, at 1300.
60. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
61. See Charles E. Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of Erie
v. Tompkins, 55 YALE L.J. 267, 273 n.24 (1946) (observing, of this sentence in Erie, “[t]his was not
a new idea,” and quoting the key passage from Wheaton for comparison); Stephen E. Sachs,
Constitutional Backdrops, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1813, 1882–83 (2012) (noting the similarity of
Wheaton’s rationale to Erie’s); Note, Clearfield: Crowded Field of Federal Common Law, 53 COLUM.
L. REV. 991, 995 n.24 (1953) (describing Wheaton as “the most emphatic denunciation of federal
general common law prior to Erie”).
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opinion by Justice Brandeis citing Wheaton—not even his solo dissent in
the famed “hot news” misappropriation case, International News Service
v. Associated Press 62 (about which, more later).
Swift v. Tyson 63 arrived in 1842, 30 years after Hudson and eight
years after Wheaton. The holding, which Erie would overthrow in 1938,
is familiar: In a diversity case, despite the Rules of Decision Act, a federal
court need not defer to the applicable state’s precedent(s) on a question of
general commercial law. 64 The word general is key here. Swift’s rationale
turns on a distinction between local law, which was the special province
of the states, and general law, which was equally discernable to state and
federal courts. 65 Explaining the scope of the Rules of Decision Act, Justice
Story averred that “[i]t has never been supposed . . . that the [Act] did
apply, or was designed to apply, to questions of a more general nature . . .
for example, to the construction of ordinary contracts or other written
instruments, and especially to questions of general commercial
law . . . .” 66 A federal court, in a diversity case, was bound to follow “local
statutes and local usages,” but not state-court decisions as “to contracts
and other instruments of a commercial nature, the true interpretation and
effect whereof are to be sought . . . in the general principles and doctrines
of commercial jurisprudence.” 67 Moreover, in reaching its own judgment
on a question of general commercial law by applying general principles,
the Swift Court, or any federal court, was simply doing the same thing that
New York’s courts had done: “Courts of New York do not found their
decisions upon this point upon any local statute, or positive, fixed, or
ancient local usage: but they deduce the doctrine from the general
principles of commercial law.” 68 General commercial law was a shared
62. 248 U.S. 215, 248 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Justice Holmes, unlike Brandeis, did
rely on Wheaton on one occasion—namely, as authority for what he termed “the often repeated
statement that there is no common law of the United States,” in his dissent in S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen,
244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Jensen, which took an expansive view of federal
admiralty jurisdiction in the teeth of an arguably applicable New York state workers’ compensation
statute, is perhaps better known for Holmes’s statement that “[t]he common law is not a brooding
omnipresence in the sky, but the articulate voice of some sovereign or quasi sovereign that can be
identified.” Id. at 222. Brandeis joined Holmes’s Jensen dissent. Id. at 255.
63. 41 U.S. 1 (1842).
64. Id. at 18–19; See also Erie, 304 U.S. at 71 (describing Swift’s holding).
65. See Bellia & Clark, supra note 33, at 664–69, 687–93 (explaining the local/general
distinction contemporaneous with Swift); Fletcher, supra note 33, at 1517–21; Nelson, supra note 7,
at 925–29.
66. Swift, 41 U.S. at 18–19 (emphases added).
67. Id. at 19 (emphasis added).
68. Id. (emphases added); see also id.(“[S]tate tribunals are called upon to perform the like
functions as ourselves, that is, to ascertain upon general reasoning and legal analogies . . . what is the
just rule furnished by the principles of commercial law to govern the case”). Professor Young puts it
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project of state and federal courts. The latter had no cause to defer to the
former.
To a modern lawyer, the key working distinction is not between local
and general law, but between state and federal law (whether that law be
statutory or decisional). The commercial-law question in Swift—whether
satisfaction of a pre-existing debt is valid consideration for signing over a
bill of exchange 69—seems like a quintessentially common-law contract
question. 70 How could a federal court disregard state common law when
answering this question, especially given that, as Wheaton tells us, there
is no national common law to use in its place? On the surface there is a
tension here—at least, again, to a modern reader.71 It can seem, as
Professor Nelson puts it, downright “baffling.” 72 But Justice Story’s
decision in Swift does not even mention, much less distinguish,
Wheaton. 73 Why not? The simplest explanation seems the likeliest. For
Story, the Swift case called for a federal judicial statement about state
general commercial law, and nothing blocked the Supreme Court (or any
federal court) from providing that statement. 74 Wheaton’s denial that there
this way: “Story did not derive the general law’s applicability in Swift from some categorical federal
choice of law principle, but rather from the decision of the New York state courts to follow the general
law in cases like Swift.” Young, supra note 7, at 36; see also Young, supra note 7, at 61 (“Story
emphasized that the New York courts applied the general common law to commercial disputes”).
69. Swift, 41 U.S at 16. For a clear, compact summary of Swift’s facts, it is hard to do better
than Young, supra note 7, at 22–23.
70. See generally 3 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS §§ 7:1–7:3, 7:8, 7:11 (4th ed.).
71. See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Business of the Supreme Court at the October Terms, 1937
and 1938, 53 HARV. L. REV. 579, 607 & n.55 (1940) (noting, in a discussion of Swift and Erie, the
tension between Swift’s rationale and Wheaton’s).
72. Nelson, supra note 7, at 929.
73. The lawyer for Tyson, who would win under direct application of the New York state cases,
did urge the relevance of Hudson. Swift, 41 U.S. at 11. He did not, however, cite Wheaton.
74. See Hart, supra note 71, at 610 (“[T]he construction which Swift v. Tyson gave to [the Rules
of Decision Act] . . . simply excluded state judicial decisions in matters of general law from the
explicit mandate of [the Act] to follow state law”). Ignorance or forgetfulness may be simpler
explanations on many occasions, but in this instance they are not. It strikes me as virtually impossible
to believe that Justice Story ignored Wheaton in Swift from lack of awareness or recollection. Justice
McLean, the author of Wheaton v Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 654 (1834), was on the Court for Swift. See 41
U.S. at viii (1842) (listing justices); Oxford Companion, supra note 20, at 1130 (listing dates in
office). Justice Story, the author of Swift, was on the Court for Wheaton. 41 U.S. at 14; See 33 U.S.
iii (1834) (listing justices); Oxford Companion, supra note 20, at 1130 (listing dates in office). Story
was more than merely present for Wheaton, however, and the case must surely have left an indelible
impression on him. First, Story was instrumental in the Supreme Court’s having hired Henry
Wheaton, in 1815, as its third official reporter. Joyce, supra note 41, at 348–49. Wheaton then lived
in the same Capitol Hill boarding house as the justices, “quickly becoming Story’s roommate or
‘chum.’” Joyce, supra note 41, at 350. The two also “assembled a common library for use while in
Washington.” Joyce, supra note 41, at 350. In short, by the time Wheaton resigned the reporter post
twelve years later, in 1827, the two men must have known each other quite well. Joyce, supra note
41, at 353. Second, in the Wheaton case itself, Story played a crucial role behind the scenes. The
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was any national common law was simply irrelevant to Swift’s state-law
question. Living, as we do, in the post-Erie world, where state decisional
law is on a par with state statutory law and the local/general distinction
within diversity cases has collapsed, 75 Swift’s failure to engage with
Wheaton is downright perplexing. That perplexity is a sign of just how big
a change Erie truly worked into our conception of the federal judicial role
in cases that turn on state law. To understand Erie, one must understand
Swift. To fully appreciate both, one should contextualize them with
Wheaton.
B.

The 1920s and ‘30s

Justice Brandeis, unlike some justices, is renowned for his
concurrences and dissents more than for his majority opinions. 76 Erie, a
majority opinion and his most consequential by far, is a contrast in that
sense. 77 Two Brandeis intellectual-property-law opinions that bookend
his career—one from his second full year on the Court (1918) and one
from his last (1938)—fit the standard Brandeis pattern. The first is a lone
dissent, and the second, albeit for a 7-2 majority, addresses a narrow
question in just a few pages. Both deepen our understanding of Erie in
noteworthy ways.

Court heard argument in Wheaton’s appeal over three days, March 11–14, 1834. Joyce, supra note
41, at 368. Four days after the argument, Story met privately with the litigants “to force a resolution
of the controversy short of final decision.” Joyce, supra note 41, at 373 n.195. The events Professor
Joyce describes are stunning:
Justice Story . . . summoned the Court’s past and present Reporters to meet with him
personally, in succession, in his chambers. Upon arriving, Wheaton was greeted by
Story . . . and handed a memorandum that Story had been “authorized by the Court to
communicate to [each of the litigants].” The memorandum, which Story likewise
furnished to Peters, advised the parties that the decision of the Court, if handed down,
would hold unanimously that no right of property did or could exist in the Justices’
opinions and that they were without power to confer upon the Court’s Reporters any
copyright thereto. . . . Wheaton reacted angrily. Three weeks earlier, Peters had rejected
his offer that “the whole Cause” be referred to arbitrators. . . . Wheaton’s formal reply to
the Court . . . while restrained in tone, firmly insisted that “the merits of the Cause so fully
& ably discussed” now be finally resolved. Left with no choice, the Court proceeded to do
as Wheaton had demanded at its conference later the same day.
Joyce, supra note 41, at 373–74 (footnotes omitted). Though Story absented himself from the Court’s
announcement of its decision, having left Washington that morning “on the 8:00 a.m. stage,” he can
hardly have forgotten the case, even eight years later. Joyce, supra note 41, at 376.
75. See Nelson, supra note 7, at 929–30.
76. Joel K. Goldstein & Charles A. Miller, Brandeis: The Legacy of A Justice, 100 MARQ. L.
REV. 461, 462–63, 468–84 (2016).
77. Id. at 465, 493–94.
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In International News Service v. Associated Press 78—or INS v. AP,
as it is usually abbreviated—the Supreme Court established
“misappropriation” as a new species of unfair competition. 79 In doing so,
the Court was innovating. INS, though a diversity case 80 sapped of any
formal legal force by Erie’s rejection of federal general common law, 81 is
the foundational case for the misappropriation doctrine. 82 The Associated
Press brought the case to stop its competitor wire service, the International
News Service, from sending information that INS had copied from AP’s
east-coast customers to INS’s own west-coast customers—who then
published stories in competition with AP’s west-coast customers. 83 AP
had no trade secret claim against INS. The information it copied and sent

78. 248 U.S. 215 (1918). The literature on INS is vast. To orient oneself among the case, the
issues, and their aftermath, see Douglas G. Baird, The Story of INS v. AP: Property, Natural
Monopoly, and the Uneasy Legacy of a Concocted Controversy, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
STORIES 9 (Jane C. Ginsburg & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss eds., 2006); Henry E. Smith, Equitable
Intellectual Property: What’s Wrong With Misappropriation?, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE
COMMON LAW 42 (Shyamkrishna Balganesh ed, 2013).
79. See INS, 248 U.S. at 242:
Regarding news matter as the mere material from which these two competing parties are
endeavoring to make money, and treating it, therefore, as quasi property [as between them]
for the purposes of their business because they are both selling it as such, defendant’s
conduct differs from the ordinary case of unfair competition in trade principally in this
that, instead of selling its own goods as those of complainant, it substitutes
misappropriation in the place of misrepresentation, and sells complainant’s goods as its
own. (second emphasis added).
80. Id. at 232–33.
81. See Barclays Capital Inc. v. Theflyonthewall.com, Inc., 650 F.3d 876 (2d Cir. 2011) (“INS
itself is no longer good law. Purporting to establish a principal of federal common law, the law
established by INS was abolished by Erie . . . .”).
82. See Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 38 cmts. b, c (Am. Law Inst. 1995)
(describing the misappropriation tort’s origin in INS). “Notwithstanding its longevity, the [INS]
decision has had little enduring effect.” Id. at cmt. b. The case began in federal court in Manhattan,
Associated Press v. Int’l News Serv., 240 F. 983 (S.D.N.Y. 1917), and arrived at the Supreme Court
on certiorari from the Second Circuit, 245 F. 244 (2d Cir. 1917). It is interesting, given the role of
these New York federal courts in the case, that New York is effectively the only state with a working
post-Erie misappropriation jurisprudence. See E.J. Brooks Co. v. Cambridge Sec. Seals, 31 N.Y.3d
441, 105 N.E.3d 301, 308 (N.Y. 2018) (describing New York misappropriation doctrine); ITC Ltd.
v. Punchgini, Inc., 9 N.Y.3d 467, 880 N.E.2d 852, 858–59 (N.Y. 2007) (same). The Second Circuit,
as a consequence, has continued to elaborate on misappropriation, though now as a spokes-court for
New York state law. See Barclays Capital, 650 F.3d at 893–906; Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola,
Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 848-54 (2d Cir. 1997). For recent scholarly accounts of the misappropriation
doctrine, see Shyamkrishna Balganesh, “Hot News”: The Enduring Myth of Property in News, 111
COLUM. L. REV. 419 (2011); Jeffrey L. Harrison & Robyn Shelton, Deconstructing and
Reconstructing Hot News: Toward a Functional Approach, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1649 (2013); Elaine
Stoll, Note, Hot News Misappropriation: More Than Nine Decades After INS v. AP, Still an
Important Remedy for News Piracy, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 1239 (2011).
83. INS, 248 U.S. at 231, 238–39. The AP client newspapers had published the information in
widely sold newspapers, as well as on publicly consulted billboards. Id. at 231.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2019

15

Akron Law Review, Vol. 52 [2019], Iss. 2, Art. 7

382

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[52:367

was publicly available, as AP intended, and no contract between INS and
AP blocked the practice. 84 AP had no copyright claim against INS. The
copyright interest had not been perfected as federal law then required, and
the underlying facts were not susceptible to copyright protection in any
event. 85 AP had no conventional unfair competition claim against INS.
INS had not sought to pass itself, or its communiqués, off as AP. 86 Failure
to credit AP as the source of the information INS sent to its west-coast
clients was a form of “false pretense” that “accentuat[ed] the wrong” INS
committed, but was “not the essence of” that wrong. 87 None of the
conventional categories readily applied.
What, then, was the wrong, exactly? What was the basis for enjoining
INS from copying facts out of AP stories and sending the items to the west
coast? The problem was, generally, one of “unfair competition in
business” 88 inasmuch as the two wire services were competitors, and
“[t]he question . . . [wa]s not so much the rights of either party as against
the public but their rights as between themselves.” 89 The Court thus broke
new common-law ground, extending unfair-competition liability to an

84. Id. at 233, 239.
85. Id. at 233–34.
86. Id. at 241–42. As the Court observed, an “attempt by defendant to palm off its goods as
those of the complainant” is “characteristic of the most familiar, if not the most typical, cases of unfair
competition.” Id. at 241. It was certainly the fact pattern with which the Court had a working
familiarity. See, e.g., Howe Scale Co. v. Wyckoff, Seamans & Benedict, 198 U.S. 118 (1905); Elgin
Nat. Watch Co. v. Illinois Watch Case Co., 179 U.S. 665 (1901); Menendez v. Holt, 128 U.S. 514
(1888).
87. INS, 248 U.S. at 242. Justice Holmes, concurring in the judgment, concluded that this
failure to credit was the essence of INS’s wrong against AP:
To produce such news as it is produced by the defendant [INS] represents by implication
that it has been acquired by the defendant’s enterprise and at its expense. . . . The falsehood
is a little more subtle, the injury a little more indirect, than in ordinary cases of unfair trade
[i.e., palming off], but I think that the principle that condemns the one condemns the other.
It is a question of how strong an infusion of fraud is necessary to turn a flavor into a poison.
The dose seems to me strong enough here to need a remedy from the law.
Id. at 247–48 (Holmes, J., concurring). As a result, Holmes concluded that “a suitable
acknowledgment of the source”—proper credit—”is all that [AP] can require.” Id. at 248. Of course,
one must wonder whether, if INS had credited AP as its information source, AP would have accused
INS of wrongly confusing consumers as to the source. Cf. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox
Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 36 (2003):
Another practical difficulty of adopting a special definition of ‘origin’ for communicative
products is that it places the manufacturers of those products in a difficult position. On the
one hand, they would face Lanham Act liability for failing to credit the creator of a work
on which their lawful copies are based; and on the other hand they could face Lanham Act
liability for crediting the creator if that should be regarded as implying the creator’s
‘sponsorship or approval’ of the copy, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A).
88. INS, 248 U.S. at 235.
89. Id. at 236.
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unusual, recalcitrant fact pattern. 90 The problem was a form of imitative
competition that threatened the destruction of the wire-service market
itself:
INS had admit[ted] that it is taking material that has been acquired by
complainant as the result of organization and the expenditure of labor,
skill, and money, and which is salable by complainant for money,
and . . . is endeavoring to reap where it has not sown . . . . Stripped of all
disguises, the process amounts to an unauthorized interference with the
normal operation of complainant’s legitimate business precisely at the
point where the profit is to be reaped, in order to divert a material portion
of the profit from those who have earned it to those who have not; with
special advantage to defendant in the competition because of the fact
that it is not burdened with any part of the expense of gathering the
news. 91

And the wire-service market could collapse, in turn, if the law provided
no remedy to one otherwise forced to share its information crop with a
second reaper: “one of the most obvious results of defendant’s theory [is]
that, by permitting indiscriminate publication by anybody and everybody
for purposes of profit in competition with the news-gatherer, it would
render publication profitless, or so little profitable as in effect to cut off
the service by rendering the cost prohibitive in comparison with the
return.” 92 Market-destroying imitative competition is a natural target for
IP-style legal regulation. 93
Brandeis, in INS, was having none of it. 94 It was not that he carried a
brief for the ethics of INS’s commercial exploitation of the information
that AP’s clients had publicized (after underwriting its collection by AP).

90. See Restatement, supra note 82, at § 38 cmt. c:
The limited extent to which the INS rationale has been incorporated into the common law
of the states indicates that the decision is properly viewed as a response to unusual
circumstances rather than as a statement of generally applicable principles of common
law. Many subsequent decisions have expressly limited the INS case to its facts.
91. INS, 248 U.S. at 239–40.
92. Id. at 241.
93. See generally Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and Economics of
Reverse Engineering, 111 YALE L.J. 1575, 1579, 1591–1607 (2002) (discussing examples). There is
a loose family resemblance between the INS majority’s rationale and the antitrust-law prohibition
against below-cost predatory pricing that destroys competition by starving competitors of the
customers that legitimate pricing would provide. See Leo J. Raskind, The Misappropriation Doctrine
As A Competitive Norm of Intellectual Property Law, 75 MINN. L. REV. 875 (1991) (exploring this
connection). On predatory pricing more generally, see Christopher R. Leslie, Predatory Pricing and
Recoupment, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1695 (2013); Lina M. Khan, Note, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox,
126 YALE L.J. 710 (2017).
94. INS, 248 U.S. at 248–267 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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“The injustice of such action is,” he said, “obvious.” 95 Nor did he disagree
that none of the established intellectual property or unfair competition
doctrines were readily applicable to remedy that injustice. Indeed, he
detailed with care the impotence of those doctrines against INS’s
competitive strategy. 96 Nor, finally, did he disagree, as a general matter,
with the salutary power of the common law to respond to new wrongs
with proven remedies: “The unwritten law possesses capacity for growth;
and has often satisfied new demands for justice by invoking analogies or
by expanding a rule or principle.” 97 The problem, for Brandeis, was that
the nature of INS’s wrong against AP, when viewed alongside the range
of conflicting interests likely involved in any effective redress, opened a
gulf too wide for a court to bridge by common-law means alone. 98
[W]ith the increasing complexity of society, the public interest tends to
become omnipresent; and the problems presented by new demands for
justice cease to be simple. Then the creation or recognition by courts of
a new private right may work serious injury to the general public, unless
the boundaries of the right are definitely established and wisely guarded.
In order to reconcile the new private right with the public interest, it may
be necessary to prescribe limitations and rules for its enjoyment; and
also to provide administrative machinery for enforcing the rules. It is
largely for this reason that, in the effort to meet the many new demands
for justice incident to a rapidly changing civilization, resort to legislation
has latterly been had with increasing frequency. 99

The conflict that AP’s case against INS brought to light was,
emphatically, a job for a legislature, not a court.
After describing, with nuance, the suite of responses a legislature
might frame in response to this new information-misappropriation
problem—ranging from no remedy, 100 to a liability rule (with actual or
with fixed damages), 101 to a property rule encumbered by a right of access

95. Id. at 262. See also id. at 267 (“[T]he propriety of some remedy appears to be clear”).
96. Id. at 249–62 (reviewing legal theories and precedents, both U.S. and English).
97. Id. at 262.
98. See id. at 263:
The rule for which the plaintiff contends would effect an important extension of property
rights and a corresponding curtailment of the free use of knowledge and of ideas; and the
facts of this case admonish us of the danger involved in recognizing such a property right
in news, without imposing upon news-gatherers corresponding obligations.
99. Id. at 262–63 (emphasis added).
100. Id. at 264 (“Legislators might conclude that it was impossible to put an end to the obvious
injustice involved in such appropriation of news, without opening the door to other evils, greater than
that sought to be remedied.”).
101. Id. at 266:

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol52/iss2/7

18

Miller: IP Federalism

2018]

IP FEDERALISM

385

for a public-utility-like reasonable, nondiscriminatory rate 102—Brandeis
concluded his analysis by pointedly described the judiciary’s institutional
limitations this way:
Courts are ill-equipped to make the investigations which should precede
a determination of the limitations which should be set upon any property
right in news or of the circumstances under which news gathered by a
private agency should be deemed affected with a public interest. Courts
would be powerless to prescribe the detailed regulations essential to full
enjoyment of the rights conferred or to introduce the machinery required
for enforcement of such regulations. 103

Unable to establish the scope of the problem or the remedy, or to stand up
the practical mechanism(s) that the remedy requires, a court should
“decline to establish a new rule of law” even in the face of what is
admittedly a newly-disclosed wrong. 104 The majority’s misstep was to
leave the judicial lane.
Brandeis’s call for judicial modesty in INS—which was rooted in
comparing different governing institutions’ competencies in responding
to different social problems—effectively foreshadowed his insistence, in
Erie, that federal courts are not authorized, relative to state courts and
legislatures, to range freely over social problems in the name of “federal
general common law.” In much the same way that INS “articulated his
recognition of the limits of judicial capacity,” Erie “might be viewed as
judicial recognition that the power of the federal judiciary was limited.” 105
His INS dissent thus lends considerable support to those who view Erie as
a “principle of judicial federalism,” who urge a “judicial federalism theory
of Erie.” 106 As Professor Mishkin put it, “[t]hat Congress may have

Or legislators dealing with the subject might conclude, that the right to news values should
be protected to the extent of permitting recovery of damages for any unauthorized use, but
that protection by injunction should be denied . . . . If a legislature concluded to recognize
property in published news to the extent of permitting recovery at law, it might, with a
view to making the remedy more certain and adequate, provide a fixed measure of
damages, as in the case of copyright infringement.
102. Id. at 266–67.
103. Id. at 267 (emphases added).
104. Id. Contra Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803) (“The government of the United
States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men. It will certainly cease to
deserve this high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right.”);
3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 109 (1768) (“[I]t is a settled
and invariable principle in the laws of England that every right, when with-held, must have a remedy,
and every injury it’s [sic] proper redress.”). For the record, I’m not throwing shade on Brandeis here,
I’m throwing it on Marshall and Blackstone.
105. Goldstein & Miller, supra note 76, at 481, 493.
106. Young, supra note 7, at 67. Young sets forth the theory in detail, id. at 67–76.
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constitutional power to make federal law displacing state substantive
policy does not imply an equal range of power for federal judges.
Principles related to the separation of powers impose an additional limit
on the authority of federal courts to engage in lawmaking on their own
(unauthorized by Congress).” 107 Courts and legislatures have distinct
powers, from which different roles flow. Brandeis’s INS dissent draws the
prudential version of this contrast between legislative and judicial
competencies, in 1918. Then, the contrast’s counsel attracted no vote but
his own.
Then came Erie in 1937. 108 ‘Nuf said, save one thing: As others have
observed, by taking federal general common law off the table, Erie serves
to highlight the fact that, at the margin, a holding that federal law preempts
state law (whether statutory or decisional) can substitute for a rule of preErie federal common law. 109 After Erie, then, the importance of

107. Paul J. Mishkin, Some Further Last Words on Erie—The Thread, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1682,
1683 (1974); see also id. at 1686-87 (“[T]he constitutional perception that [federal] courts are
inappropriate makers of laws intruding upon the states’ views of social policy in the areas of state
competence”). At around the same time, Professor Monaghan offered much the same take on Erie.
See Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term—Foreward: Constitutional Common Law,
89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 11–12 (1975) (“Erie . . . recognizes that federal judicial power to displace state
law is not coextensive with the scope of dormant congressional power. Rather, [a federal court] must
point to some source, such as a statute, treaty, or constitutional provision, as authority for the creation
of substantive federal law.”) (footnote omitted); Henry P. Monaghan, Hart and Wechsler’s The
Federal Courts and the Federal System, 87 HARV. L. REV. 889, 892 (1974) (book review) (“Erie is,
fundamentally, a limitation on the federal court’s power to displace state law absent some relevant
constitutional or statutory mandate which neither the general language of article III nor the
jurisdictional statute provides”).
108. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
109. See, e.g., John C.P. Goldberg, Benjamin Cardozo and the Death of the Common Law, 34
TOURO L. REV. 147, 151 (2018):
Mostly disabled from inviting federal judges to make general common law, defendants
instead argue that federal law simply bars state courts from doing what they have been
doing. And, starting with New York Times v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court has shown itself
prepared to deem entire swaths of state tort law null and void, often in the name of
protecting business interests.
(footnote omitted). Indeed, one can readily state the Erie holding itself in preemption terms: “Erie . . .
hold[s], as a matter of constitutional law, that federal courts must apply state law—whether written
or unwritten—unless such law is preempted by the Constitution, acts of Congress, or treaties.”
Anthony J. Bellia Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, General Law in Federal Court, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV.
655, 659 (2013). More recent Supreme Court descriptions of federal common law, well after Erie,
hew the preemption line. See Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981):
There is, of course, no federal general common law. Nevertheless, the Court has
recognized the need and authority in some limited areas to formulate what has come to be
known as federal common law. These instances are few and restricted and fall into
essentially two categories: those in which a federal rule of decision is necessary to protect
uniquely federal interests, and those in which Congress has given the courts the power to
develop substantive law.
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determining whether federal law preempts state law (notwithstanding
their generally concurrent jurisdiction over commercial regulation) comes
into sharper focus.
Just seven months later, in one of his last opinions for the Court,
Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 110 Justice Brandeis kicked off the
Court’s modern preemption jurisprudence within intellectual property
law. 111 The dispute, a diversity case, pitted state trademark law against
federal patent law. And, despite its brevity, the decision touched on a
broad array of trademark principles that continue to shape trademark
doctrine. 112 In the Erie context, however, just two facets of Kellogg are
germane.
The first is judicially enforced federal preemption of state law. For
Brandeis, this is no INS; preemption is very much in the judicial lane.
Nabisco (as National Biscuit Co. would later be known) sued Kellogg in
Delaware federal court alleging state-law unfair competition claims. 113
Kellogg was, according to Nabisco, deceiving breakfast-cereal consumers
merely by “us[ing] . . . the name shredded wheat” and by “produc[ing] its
biscuit in pillow-shaped form.” 114 It was common ground that Nabisco did
“not possess the exclusive right to make shredded wheat” cereal 115; the
utility and design patents that covered shredded wheat had long since gone
out of force. 116 The end of those federal patent rights sharply limited the
(internal quotations and citations omitted); See generally Ernest A. Young, Preemption and Federal
Common Law, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1639 (2008).
110. 305 U.S. 111 (1938). Brandeis wrote only five decisions after Kellogg, all for Court
majorities. See State of Minnesota v. United States, 305 U.S. 382 (1939); Indianapolis Brewing Co.
v. Liquor Control Comm’n of State of Michigan, 305 U.S. 391 (1939); Joseph S. Finch & Co. v.
McKittrick, 305 U.S. 395 (1939); State of California v. Latimer, 305 U.S. 255 (1938); Gen. Talking
Pictures Corp. v. W. Elec. Co., 305 U.S. 124 (1938).
111. That jurisprudence is large and continues to grow. For the major post-Kellogg cases see
Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989); Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil
Co., 440 U.S. 257 (1979); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974); Goldstein v.
California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964);
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964); Sperry v. State of Fla. ex rel. Fla. Bar, 373
U.S. 379 (1963).
112. See generally Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Story of Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co.:
Breakfast With Brandeis, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STORIES 220 (Jane C. Ginsburg & Rochelle
Cooper Drey-fuss eds. 2006).
113. Kellogg, 305 U.S. at 113.
114. Id.; see also id. at 116 (Nabisco “claims the exclusive right to the trade name ‘Shredded
Wheat’ and the exclusive right to make shredded wheat biscuits pillow-shaped. It charges that the
defendant, by using the name and shape, and otherwise, is passing off, or enabling others to pass off,
Kellogg goods for those of the plaintiff.”). Nabisco did not present any evidence of actual consumer
confusion about the source of Kellogg’s cereal, and Kellogg’s packaging readily distinguished its
product from Nabisco’s. Id. at 120–22.
115. Id. at 116.
116. Id. at 117–18, 119 & n.4.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2019

21

Akron Law Review, Vol. 52 [2019], Iss. 2, Art. 7

388

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[52:367

reach of state remedies for unfair competition. Regarding the use of the
name “shredded wheat,” the Court reasoned that descriptive use of the
term “shredded” throughout the patents pertaining to the product carried
the term into public use with the patents’ end: “there passed to the public
upon the expiration of the patent, not only the right to make the article as
it was made during the patent period, but also the right to apply thereto
the name by which it had become known.” 117 Similarly, regarding the use
of the pillow shape for the biscuit, the Court reasoned that “upon
expiration of the patents the form, as well as the name, was dedicated to
the public.” 118 In short, post-patent, “the name and form are integral parts
of the goodwill of the article,” and “[t]o share fully in the goodwill”—
which it was Kellogg’s right to do—”it must use the name and the pillowshape.” 119 The state-law cause of action for unfair competition withered
in the shadow of the federal principles derived from the fact that U.S.
patents expire.
The second noteworthy facet of Kellogg is the Court’s pronounced
disinterest in confining itself to state-court articulations of unfaircompetition law. Given the ultimate force of federal preemption in the
case, greater interest in the details of the relevant state’s decisional law
might have made little to no practical difference. Even so, the quick work
Justice Brandeis made of the matter, in the first footnote in the case, takes
me (at least) by surprise:
The federal jurisdiction rests on diversity of citizenship—National
Biscuit Company being a New Jersey corporation and Kellogg
Company a Delaware corporation. Most of the issues in the case involve
questions of common law and hence are within the scope of Erie R. Co.
v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). But no claim has been made that the
local law is any different from the general law on the subject, and both
parties have relied almost entirely on federal precedents. 120

Our old friend from Swift, the local v. general law distinction, has
returned! Given the constitutional footing on which Brandeis put Erie’s
rationale, 121 one might have expected the Court to treat the choice between

117. Id. at 118.
118. Id. at 119–20.
119. Id. at 121. In the absence of consumer confusion as to source, the consumer benefit from
competition in this product market is the usual one, i.e., a lower quality-adjusted price.
120. Id. at 113 n.1.
121. See Erie, 304 U.S. at 77–78 (“If only a question of statutory construction were involved,
we should not be prepared to abandon a doctrine so widely applied throughout nearly a century. But
the unconstitutionality of the course pursued has now been made clear and compels us to do so.”)
(footnote omitted).
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federal and state law in a diversity case as a matter that the parties cannot
waive (akin to the jurisdictional question of Article III standing).
Moreover, in May 1938, just after Erie and six months before Kellogg,
the Court vacated and remanded five cases on the ground that each
required the application of state, not federal, common law. 122 The Court
might have been done the same in Kellogg; four years later, after all, the
Court would vacate and remand a Third Circuit decision for the express
purpose of ensuring that state trademark law supplied the rule of
decision. 123 All the same, the applicability of ordinary waiver principles
is hard to mistake in footnote 1 of Kellogg. 124 As a result, Brandeis could
proceed to preemption and other issues.
INS foreshadows Erie’s rejection of Swift’s overreach. Kellogg turns
our attention from Erie itself to the preemption questions that the new
state-federal balance would foreground. The intense conflicts of dual
federalism’s separate spheres are gone. The low-grade conflicts of
concurrent federalism are here to stay—in intellectual property law as
much as in any other area.
III. CONCLUSION
As Professor Wiecek observed, “[t]he debate engendered by Swift
and Erie will persist as the Court continues to define the contours of
judicial federalism in the United States.” 125 Judicial and legislative
122. Ruhlin v. New York Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 202, 205–09 (1938); New York Life Ins. Co.
v. Jackson, 304 U.S. 261, 262 (1938); Rosenthal v. New York Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 263, 264 (1938);
Hudson v. Moonier, 304 U.S. 397, 398 (1938); Mut. Ben., Health & Accident Ass’n v. Bowman, 304
U.S. 549, 550 (1938).
123. Pecheur Lozenge Co. v. Nat’l Candy Co., 315 U.S. 666, 667 (1942).
124. See also Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo S.A. v. All. Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 318
n.3 (1999):
Although this is a diversity case, respondents’ complaint sought the injunction pursuant to
Rule 65, and the Second Circuit’s decision was based on that rule and on federal equity
principles. Petitioners argue for the first time before this Court that under Erie R. Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), the availability of this injunction under Rule 65 should be
determined by the law of the forum State (in this case New York). Because this argument
was neither raised nor considered below, we decline to consider it.
The U.S. Courts of Appeals also treat the Erie choice federal or state law as a waivable question. See,
e.g., Reading Health Sys. v. Bear Stearns & Co., 900 F.3d 87, 98 & n.48 (3d Cir. 2018); McCleskey
v. CWG Plastering, LLC, 897 F.3d 899, 901 (7th Cir. 2018); Edward Lewis Tobinick, MD v. Novella,
848 F.3d 935, 943–44 (11th Cir. 2017). That conforms this choice-of-law question to the treatment
of choice-of-law questions more generally. See Williams v. BASF Catalysts LLC, 765 F.3d 306, 316
(3d Cir. 2014) (“All U.S. Courts of Appeals to have addressed the issue have held that choice-of-law
issues may be waived. . . . Our review of the law in this area convinces us that parties may waive
choice-of-law issues.”).
125. William M. Wiecek, Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 301, 301 (2d ed., 2005).
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engagements with IP law will continue to reflect and inform that debate,
especially given that such cases now occupy a substantial, and growing,
share of the Supreme Court’s docket. 126 Courts, both state and federal, can
best contribute to the ongoing elaboration of IP law in our federalist
context by remaining independent voices, discussing the substantive
interests and tradeoffs that IP law and policy reflect with as much depth
and insight as they can muster, as challenging as that may be. 127 And as
state and federal courts celebrate themselves, sing themselves, perhaps
they will find that every IP atom belonging to one belongs just as well, in
its own way, to the other. 128

126. See Joseph Scott Miller, Which Supreme Court Cases Influenced Recent Supreme Court IP
Decisions? A Case Study, 21 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 1, 1–5 & figs. 1 & 2 (2017) (describing and charting
the rise in Supreme Court IP cases from 1994 to 2017).
127. As Professor Baird observed, “[t]he common law judge reasons by analogy, and when a
new kind of intellectual property dispute confronts him, he must search for analogies in a legal
universe that, like all universes in which first principles dot the landscape, is so primitive and so
unformed that it is hard to identify clear landmarks.” Douglas G. Baird, Common Law Intellectual
Property Law and the Legacy of International News Service v. Associated Press, 50 U. CHI. L. REV.
411, 428 (1983).
128. See Song of Myself, supra note 3, at 29 (“I celebrate myself, | And what I assume you shall
assume, | For every atom belonging to me as good belongs to you.”).
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